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Part ⅠIntroduction 
In the research of science, different people play different roles. Scientists establish 
their theories by conjectures resulted from the investigation and exploration of nature 
or universe, and thereafter test them. Sociologists research how science influences 
human society and what the influence is. For example, with the development of 
science, our life is improved, and it is possible that our value theory will take place a 
corresponding change. The change of value theory may be a subject researched by 
socialists. Philosophers of science try to explain what on earth science is and research 
what method guides the progress of science. In fact, from the historical point of view, 
the history of human being is also the history of science. With the development of 
human being, science also makes progress. From the history of science, we can see 
strong points and weaknesses in different development stages and learn some 
experiences and lessons. Consequently, historical research is helpful to study the 
progress of science. 
In general, before doing a scientific research, we may have an elementary idea and 
set an explicit goal. Upon this basis, we construct a practical scheme to achieve the 
goal. However, these are not enough. Effective and rational methods are also needed. 
Without the guidance of methods, it is impossible to achieve a goal. Thus, methods 
play an important role in scientific research. Many philosophers of science devote 
themselves to the research about the methodology of science. The idea of this thesis 
just originates from my interest in the methodology of science. Science attracts me all 
the while, because it not only makes us know the world in which we live and the 
universe space out of our world, but also gives our lives great changes. Without 
science and scientific progress, we may still live a primeval and uncivilized life. Then, 
what method has such power to specify a criterion to demarcate science from 
pseudoscience and to guide the progress of science? It motivates me to study the 
methodology of science. It is well-known that Karl Popper makes great contributions 
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in the aspect of the methodology of science. And Imre Lakatos further develops and 
modifies Popper’s theory. Consequently, it is very necessary to understand Popper’s 
and Lakatos’ arguments comprehensively in order to study the methodology of 
science research. Popper advocates a deductive method rather than an inductive one 
and replaces the confirmation criterion of demarcation with his falsification criterion 
of demarcation. Lakatos’ main contribution to the philosophy of science is an effort to 
harmonize the disagreement between Popper’s falsificationism and Kuhn’s structure 
of scientific revolutions. In Popper’s view, once a theory is falsified, it has to be 
replaced; and scientists actively seek falsifying observations. However, for Kuhn, the 
falsification does not play an important in normal science and a decision to reject a 
theory can be made by a group of social and non-rational factors. After carefully 
reviewing the history of science as well as analysing Popper’s and Kuhn’s theories, 
Lakatos proposes his methodology of scientific research programmes. Actually, 
Popper’s falsificationism has much more and deeper influence on Lakatos. Just as 
Lakatos said in his The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, he tried to 
develop Popper’s programme a step further in order to escape Kuhn’s stricture. 
Actually, both of them pursue a necessary rational reconstruction of scientific practice. 
This thesis mainly concerns Lakatos’ modification of Popper’s falsificationism, not 
Kuhn’s theory.  
This thesis aims to understand Popper’s falsificationism and Lakatos’ methodology 
of scientific research programmes right and to grasp why and how Lakatos modifies 
Popper’s falsificationism to be the methodology of scientific research programmes. 
Firstly, it sets forth a background in which Lakatos makes the modification. The 
background is a basis on which we study why Lakatos modifies Popper’s 
falsificationism. In order to understand Lakatos’ motivation for making the 
modification better, the section will be described according to Lakatos’ view. It briefly 
reviews some methodologies of science before Popper, and then explains the two 
phases of Popper’s methodological falsificationism--naïve methodological 
falsificationism and sophisticated methodological falsificationism--and makes a 
comparison between them. Secondly, this thesis states Lakatos’ comments about 
MSc in Philosophy                                                                      Mo Liu 
 3
Popper’s methodological falsificationism, and then explains why and how Lakatos 
makes the modification and what his modification is. Moreover, it also makes a 
comparison between Popper’s falsificationism and the modification. Thirdly, having 
made comments about the influences of their theories, this thesis shows some 
criticisms raised by contemporary philosophers of science and discusses some of their 
potential problems. Finally, it makes a brief summary about the whole discussion and 
draws a conclusion that Lakatos modifies Popper’s falsificationism effectively and 
improves it more sophisticated.  
Although Lakatos tries to solve the conflict between Popper’s falsificationism and 
Kuhn’s theory by the modification, I do not attempt to describe the conflict in detail or 
compare these two theories. Instead, I seek to discuss how Lakatos modifies Popper’s 
falsificationism and ultimately establishes his methodology of scientific research 
programmes. By reviewing, analysing and comparing them, we can further understand 
how the methodology of science makes progress. Additionally, this study admits that 
Lakatos’ modification is significant and that it is more progressive and more 
consistent with the history of science than Popper’s falsificationism, nevertheless, it 
also offers some potential problems of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programmes. They may be topics of discussion in future research. 
Part Ⅱ Background and the basis of the modification 
2.1 Methodology research before Popper 
In the philosophy of science, many philosophers devote themselves to research 
about what science is or what the criterion of demarcation is. According to Lakatos’ 
summary, before Popper, there were several influential views as follows.  
Firstly, justificationists identify scientific knowledge with proven propositions. 
Lakatos classifies them as classical intellectualists who hold that intellectual intuition 
or experience can make extra logical “proofs” and classical empiricists who hold that 
only a few “factual propositions” with “proven facts” are self-evident and that their 
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truth-value is determined by experiences. In order to prove theories based on 
experience, classical empiricists extend to inductive reasoning from deductive 
reasoning of classical intellectualists. Both believe that scientific theories should be 
proven by empirical facts. Generally, deduction and induction are two distinct 
reasoning methods in logic. The difference between them is that in deduction, the 
premises can entail the conclusion and the inference is from the general to the 
particular; and whereas in induction, the premises cannot entail the conclusion and the 
inference is from the particular to the general. It is owing to their different characters 
that people think that induction can provide us with something new, not deduction. 
For example, in a deductive reasoning, from two premises: all husbands are married 
and Tom is a husband, it follows that Tom is married. In effect, the conclusion has 
been implied in premises. However, in an inductive reasoning, if all ravens you have 
ever seen are black, you might then say ‘all ravens are black’. People think that 
induction is more important than deduction in science since it supplies more 
information to us. However, in the eighteenth century, David Hume raised “the 
problem of induction” that induction is not justified. That is, it is not justified to infer 
to a future unobserved statement from a series of observed singular statements. So, the 
reliability of inductive reasoning is shaken. It may be problematic that a theory should 
be proved by empirical facts. In order to avoid the problem, probabilists make an 
attempt to modify the view of justificationism. 
Probabilists try to use probability to reduce the problem of induction. They believe 
that theories may have a certain degree of probability relative to the empirical 
evidence, even if theories cannot be proven thoroughly. Theories with a higher degree 
of probability are better, and closer to science than theories with a lower degree of 
probability. However, according to the view, scientists cannot make a sharp distinction 
between science and pseudoscience. It just provides them with a fuzzy scope, not a 
clear criterion. Popper raises his objection to the view of probabilism. Firstly, he 
thinks that this view cannot effectively avoid the problem of justification of induction. 
He points out that  
“if a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to statements based on inductive inference, 
MSc in Philosophy                                                                      Mo Liu 
 5
then this will have to be justified by invoking a new principle of induction, appropriately 
modified. And this new principle in its turn will have to be justified, and so on. Nothing is 
gained, moreover, if the principle of induction, in its turn, is taken not as ‘true’ but only as 
‘probable’. In short, like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference, 
or ‘probability logic’, leads either to an infinite regress, or to the doctrine of apriorism”. 
(Popper, the 5th edition, p30, italics in original) 
Secondly, he indicates that the view of probabilism results from a confusion of 
psychological with logical questions. So-called degree of probability is simply a kind 
of psychological tendency. In other words, the degree of probability comes from the 
degree of belief which scientists hold. It changes in the light of new evidence. When 
scientists discover new evidence to support a theory, their degree of belief in the 
theory will improve. The degree of probability of the theory will also improve 
accordingly. However, theories are either true or false in logic. There is no “middle of 
the road”. From the point of logical view, the probability of a theory is zero if it is not 
one. So, zero or one may not correctly measure scientists’ degree of belief in a theory. 
Thirdly, Popper holds that the view of probabilism does not work for the demarcation 
of science because the mathematical probability of all theories is zero under the 
specific account of evidence. In his opinion, no matter how many experiments can 
support a theory, comparing with infinite number of possible experiments, the 
probability of the theory is zero. By above arguments, Popper indicates that the view 
of probabilism is irrational. At the same time, he overturns the traditional empirical 
view that theories must be proven by facts. He proposes that the criterion of 
demarcation is not concerned with facts, but rather the potential falsifiability of a 
theory. This will be discussed in detail in the following text. 
Generally speaking, Popper’s falsificationism is divided into two phases by later 
philosophers: dogmatic (or naturalistic) falsificationism and methodological 
falsificationism. The notion of “naturalistic” comes from Popper. In The logic of 
scientific discovery, Popper said that “this view, according to which methodology is 
an empirical science in its turn—a study of the actual behaviour of scientists, or of the 
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actual procedure of ‘science’—may be described as ‘naturalistic’”.1However, Lakatos 
objects to the above division. In The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 
he explicitly indicates that Popper never actually puts forward dogmatic 
falsificationist view and it is really just Ayer and some philosophers who attribute this 
view to Popper.  
2.2 Dogmatic falsificationism 
Popper’s falsificationism is based on the criticism and modification to dogmatic 
falsificationism. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism can be considered as background 
information to understand Popper’s falsificationism. Dogmatic falsificationists declare 
that all scientific theories are fallible except their empirical basis which consists of a 
set of “potential falsifiers”--observational propositions which may disprove a theory. 
Lakatos thinks that dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest brand of justificationism 
since “it is strictly empiricist without being inductivist: it denies that the certainty of 
the empirical basis can be transmitted to theories”.2 It claims a different criterion to 
demarcate science from pseudoscience. According to dogmatic falsificationism, 
empirical fact is still a tool to test and judge theories, nevertheless, it is not used to 
confirm but falsify a theory. That is, a theory is regarded as “scientific” as long as it 
can be falsified or potentially falsified by empirical facts. This particularly stresses the 
decisive function of empirical counterevidence to judge a theory. 
As for dogmatic falsificationism, Lakatos points out that it is untenable because of 
its two false assumptions and a narrow criterion of demarcation between scientific and 
non-scientific.  
The first assumption of dogmatic falsificationism is that “there is a natural, 
psychological borderline between theoretical or speculative propositions on the one 
hand and factual or observational (or basic) propositions on the other”.3 That is, it 
                                                        
1 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson of London, the 5th edition, 1968, p52. 
2 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p12. 
3 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p14. 
MSc in Philosophy                                                                      Mo Liu 
 7
separates observations from theories completely. It indicates that observations which 
falsify theories are existent independently of theories. However, it is evident that 
observations are actually based on theories and guided by theories. That is, 
observations are theory-dependent. Let us imagine that, if we do not apply any theory 
when we observe an event, how can we interpret it or express the observation? We 
even cannot say its colour and shape. Once we get a result, we have applied (previous) 
theories to directing the observation. Neither theories nor observations can be isolated. 
Without observations, theories are fancies. Without theories, observations are just 
images. Although dogmatic falsificationists apply observations to the test of theory, 
these observations are still based on previous theories and observations. So, it is 
impossible to separate observations from theories thoroughly. 
The other assumption is that “if a proposition satisfies the psychological criterion 
of being factual or observational (or basic) then it is true; one may say that it was 
proved from facts”.4 Lakatos holds that logic can destroy this assumption since “no 
factual proposition can ever be proved from an experiment. Propositions can only be 
derived from other propositions, they cannot be derived from facts: one cannot prove 
statements from experiences”. 5  Popper also proposes the similar view that 
“statements can be logically justified only by statements”.6 In other words, we cannot 
decide the truth-value of an “observational” proposition by experiences, so we fail to 
prove it factual from experiences. Then, it may be concluded that factual propositions 
are fallible (since they are unprovable). If so, it is problematic to use a fallible factual 
proposition to test and falsify a theory. Therefore, the contradiction between a theory 
and a factual proposition is simply regarded as an inconsistency, not falsification. 
The narrow criterion of demarcation made by dogmatic falsificationism is that 
“only those theories are ‘scientific’ which forbid certain observable states of affairs 
and therefore are factually disprovable. Or a theory is ‘scientific’ if it has an empirical 
                                                        
4 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p14. 
5 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p16. 
6 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson of London, the 5th edition, 1968, p43. 
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basis”.7 It seems to imply that the theory will have certain logical implications, which 
can be tested by observations. However, as mentioned before, experiences cannot 
prove a theory. Lakatos takes an imaginary story to explain the problem of this 
criterion of demarcation8. The story shows that a physicist of the pre-Einsteinian era 
adopts Newton’s mechanics and Newton’s law of gravitation, (N), the accepted initial 
conditions, I, to calculate the orbit of a newly discovered small planet, p. But the 
actual motion of p is inconsistent with the calculated orbit. According to dogmatic 
falsificationism, once the inconsistency is established, it will refute the theory N, since 
the inconsistency is forbidden by Newton’s theory. However, the Newtonian physicist 
does not do that but rather proposes that an auxiliary hypothesis such as a planet p’ 
which is unknown until now may bother the motion of p. He makes a careful 
calculation about the mass and orbit of p’ and requests an experimental astronomer to 
help him to test his hypothesis. It may take them a lot of time and money to do it. If 
the final result shows that the unknown planet p’ does exist, it will be regarded as a 
success of Newton’s theory. If it is not, the physicist will continue making a further 
suggestion to explain the inconsistency until it is solved; or it is left aside and never 
remembered by anyone. 
Popper tries to solve the above problems with the help of convention. In general, 
this is called “methodological falsificationism”. 
2.3 Popper’s methodological falsificationism 
Actually, Popper was inspired to research the problem of demarcation of science 
when Einstein’s prediction about gravitation was successfully verified by the findings 
of Eddington and it shook the stable status of Newton’s theory. He aims to clarify the 
method of empirical sciences and describe the objective scientific growth. Lakatos 
divides Popper’s methodological falsificationism into naïve and sophisticated 
methodological falsificationism. 
                                                        
7 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p14. 
8 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p16-17. 
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2.3.1 Naïve methodological falsificationism 
In general, naïve methodological falsificationism is thought as the initial form of 
Popper’s falsificationism. It is the introduction of methodological decisions which 
replace the assumptions of dogmatic falsificationism. Popper explores empirical 
science within the framework of logic. By advocating deductive reasoning instead of 
inductive reasoning, Popper bypasses the traditional problem of justification of 
induction effectively. He thinks that only deductive method is valid in logic. In 
deduction, the truth of premises entails the truth of the conclusion. According to “the 
modus tollens of classic logic”, once people find a singular statement which is 
contradictory to a universal statement, people can falsify the universal statement. One 
counterexample is enough to falsify the universal statement. For example, once we 
observe one non-black raven, we can falsify the proposition “all ravens are black”. If 
the contradictory statement is not observed, the universal statement will be simply 
retained, not regarded as being true or even more likely to be true. The problem of 
induction does not exist in above reasoning. 
Here, Popper calls a statement as a premise in an empirical falsification a “basic 
statement” or a “basic proposition”. He claims that “basic statements are accepted as 
the result of a decision or agreement; and to that extent they are conventions”.9 
Generally, they are regarded as unproblematic background knowledge to test a theory. 
Background knowledge is changeable over time. And it is possible that, with the 
progress of science, previously unproblematic background knowledge becomes 
problematic and is replaced by new convention. Comparing with dogmatic 
falsificationism, naïve methodological falsificationism may make more theories be 
applied in testing with the help of unproblematic background knowledge. 
Popper applies the logical and conventional argument to the discussion of scientific 
theories. He proposes that a singular observation or statement cannot affirm a theory 
but falsify a theory, and he admits that scientific theories must be falsifiable. 
“Falsifiable” is not equal to “false”. It simply means that a theory is capable of being 
                                                        
9 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson of London, the 5th edition, 1968, p106. 
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falsified, not that it has been falsified. In other words, a falsifiable theory means that 
there must be a possibility that an observation may show the theory to be false, even if 
it has not been made yet. Falsifiability becomes the basic condition of scientific 
theory and the criterion to judge a theory good or bad. Falsifiability requires a theory 
to have two features: clarity and precision. That is, clearer and more precise theories 
are more falsifiable. For example, Popper thinks that Marxian theory cannot be 
falsified because it is not clear and precise, thus, it is not scientific.  
Falsification in naïve methodological falsificationism is different from that in 
dogmatic falsificationism. According to dogmatic falsificationism, falsification and 
rejection are conflated. If a theory is falsified, it is rejected immediately. However, 
according to naïve methodological falsificationism, falsification is separated from 
rejection. If a theory is “falsified”, it may be not false and it is not rejected at once, 
since a theory is not only constructed by hypotheses, but also affected by auxiliary 
hypotheses, such as experimental conditions and background theories. It is difficult to 
determine which one of them results in a final falsification. This point is just the 
difficulty of naïve methodological falsificationism. Consequently, falsification does 
not necessarily lead to rejection. 
For the objective scientific growth, Popper envisions that science originates from 
problems about world or universe; and scientists make speculative and tentative 
conjectures in order to solve problems. It is just these conjectures that construct 
theories. Once conjectures are proposed, they will be strictly tested by experiments 
and observations. The theory which is not tenable in the face of experimental and 
observational tests is “falsified” and may be rejected. Only theories which succeed to 
stand up to tests can survive. However, at this time, the process is not finished. 
Survival is just tentative and it will be still tested by experiments or observations, 
since it is possible that a theory which has survived so far will be falsified in the 
future. When it is finally falsified, a new problem appears. The process may proceed 
infinitely. Consequently, Popper believes that science never reaches the truth and it 
only approaches to the truth (because of the infinity of experiments and observations). 
According to this view, the growth of science seems to be a process of scientific 
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evolution. 
The naïve methodological falsificationism, although it is more liberal than 
dogmatic falsificationism, raises a relevant problem. As far as a basic statement is 
concerned, if scientists accept it by a convention, why can scientists not also “prove” 
a hypothesis through “induction” based upon a convention?10 In other words, Popper 
admits that a basic statement is a convention to the extent, and that the basic statement 
is open to change—for example, when Einstein’s statement that the mass of an object 
becomes less when it moves is accepted by scientists agreement, one basic statement 
of Newtonian physics that the mass of a moving object is constant would be changed. 
Then, it is also possible that with the help of a convention, scientists stipulate that a 
universal statement is inductively confirmed by observations. This problem is worth 
considering. 
2.3.2 Sophisticated methodological falsificationism 
Sophisticated methodological falsificationism is an advance on naïve 
methodological falsificationism. Popper realizes that although naïve methodological 
falsificationism is valid in logic, it is rather limited and raises some problems, such as 
that some scientific theories seem to be irrational according to it. Lakatos takes the 
example of Mercury’s perihelion11. Although it was regarded as an anomaly of 
Newton’s theory, it was not generally regarded as a falsifier. So Popper attempts to 
improve naïve methodological falsificationism to be sophisticated.  
According to sophisticated methodological falsificationism, a scientific theory T1 is 
falsified iff another theory T2 comes along and satisfies the following three 
conditions:  
1) T2 has “excess empirical content” over T1; in other words, T2 can predict novel 
facts which T1 does not or cannot explain;  
2) T2 includes “all the unrefuted content” of T1; in other words, T2 can explain the 
previous success of T1; 
                                                        
10 Alexander Bird, Philosophy of Science, UCL Press, 1998, p242. 
11 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p30. 
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3) Some of the excess content of T2 is confirmed by experiment or observation.  
Here, excess and confirmed empirical content replaces experimental evidence to 
falsify a theory among a series of theories. A theory cannot be abandoned as falsified 
before a better one is found. Although we might find that a number of experiments or 
observations are contradictory with a theory, all of them are not enough to falsify or 
reject the theory. We can do nothing but waiting until a better theory comes out. This 
better theory should subsume not only the content of the old one, but also novel 
predictions. This feature tells us how a theory grows or develops. It shows that 
falsification is a multiple relation among rival theories and experiments, not a 
two-side relation between a theory and experiments. It is more compatible with 
history of science than previous falsificationisms. For example, why is Einstein’s 
theory of relativity “better” than Newton’s theory? The reason is not that one is 
falsified, whereas the other is not. The real reason is that the former can explain not 
only phenomena which the latter explains, but also facts about electromagnetic waves 
which Newtonian laws of motion fail to explain. 
For the objective scientific growth, sophisticated methodological falsificationists 
think that science is composed of bold conjectures and cautious conjectures. Scientists 
adopt different attitudes to falsification according to different conjectures. Cautious 
conjectures have lower degree of risk, so the falsification of them can provide us with 
more information. However, in general, bold conjectures have higher degree of risk. It 
shows that bold conjectures predict some novel facts which are inconsistent with 
existing scientific theories. The falsification of them is pretty much what we would 
probably expect to happen, whereas the confirmation of them may be informative. 
Consequently, only the confirmation of bold conjectures and the falsification of 
cautious conjectures are helpful to the prediction of novel facts. It is obvious that bold 
conjectures play an important role in the objective scientific growth and that a better 
theory has bold conjectures. It is worth clarifying that both “bold” and “novel” are 
relative notions. They are changeable over time. Once a conjecture is confirmed to be 
a part of scientific theory, it will not be bold any more. For example, Copernican 
theory is bold and novel relative to Ptolemaic theory, but it is not relative to Kepler’s 
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theory. 
Sophisticated methodological falsificationism has two main characters: 
Firstly, sophisticated methodological falsificationists recognize the continuity of 
scientific knowledge and specify a series of theories rather than a particular theory as 
the basic research unit of science. By the replacement, they make falsifiability a 
comparative or relative matter, since it is difficult for us to be sure what the degree of 
falsifiability of a particular theory is, but we can make sure which one is more 
falsifiable by comparing two theories. For example, in general, a theory with higher 
degree of falsifiability will be capable of testing in a greater number of circumstances. 
It is stricter than naïve methodological falsificationism in this point. 
Secondly, sophisticated methodological falsificationists clarify the influence of 
auxiliary hypotheses on theories. Popper affirms that “saving a theory with the help of 
auxiliary hypotheses which satisfy certain well-defined conditions represents 
scientific progress; but saving a theory with the help of auxiliary hypotheses which do 
not, represents degeneration”.12 Linguistic adjustments and hypotheses which fail to 
be tested in any way are regarded as ad hoc and removed from the convention of 
auxiliary hypotheses. Based on this division, Popper further proposes progressive 
problemshifts and degenerative problemshifts. In his opinion, every new theory 
includes the previous theory and some auxiliary hypotheses dealing with anomalies. If 
a new theory has excess empirical content which predicts novel facts over its 
antecedent, then, we can say that such a series of theories is theoretically progressive. 
And, if some of the excess empirical content is confirmed by experiments, then, we 
can say that the theoretically progressive series of theories is also empirically 
progressive. If the series of theories is both theoretically and empirically progressive, 
it is progressive, and it is degenerating if it is not. Sophisticated methodological 
falsificationists hold that problemshifts are scientific if and only if they are at least 
theoretically progressive. The evaluation of theories is shifted to the evaluation of 
series of theories. Lakatos inherits the division between progressive and degenerative 
                                                        
12 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p33. 
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problemshifts in his discussion of methodology of scientific research programmes13. 
Even though sophisticated methodological falsificationism is more broad-minded 
and more reasonable than previous falsificationism, it is still problematic. It is still 
involved with convention in order to save theories from refutation. Popper’s 
methodological falsificationism does not get rid of convention. 
2.3.3 Contrast between naïve and sophisticated methodological 
falsificationism 
Having discussed naïve and sophisticated methodological falsificationism, it may 
be helpful to contrast them. Lakatos concludes the following differences: 
At first, their research objects are different. Naïve methodological falsificationists 
only research and test particular theories. However, sophisticated methodological 
falsificationists research and test a series of theories. By comparison, they may make 
sure of a different degree of falsifiability between rival theories. 
Secondly, they make different criterions of demarcation. According to naïve 
methodological falsificationism, the criterion of demarcation is the falsifiability of 
theory. That is, only theories which can be falsified by experiments or observations 
are scientific. However, sophisticated methodological falsificationism emphasizes the 
comparison between competitive theories. So their criteria of demarcation are excess 
and confirmed empirical content (which is mentioned above). That is, newer theories 
not only have the content of old theories, but also have excess empirical content 
which old theories do not have or cannot explain. And the excess content can deal 
with refutations which old theories encounter. This difference also induces another 
difference—the difference of a crucial element in falsification; the “falsifying” or 
“refuting” evidence of a theory. In naïve methodological falsificationism, since the 
progress of science is motivated by the falsification of a theory, so, it is a passive 
process. However, in sophisticated methodological falsificationism, its crucial 
element is the confirmed evidence of excess information which predicts novel facts. 
                                                        
13 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p48. 
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And the progress of science results from the competition between rival theories, so, it 
is an active process. 
Moreover, their methods to deal with a falsified theory are different. Naïve 
methodological falsificationism rejects it, whereas sophisticated methodological 
falsificationism replaces it by a better one. The better one has “all unrefuted content” 
of the previous theory. So, sophisticated methodological falsificationism is more 
tolerant. 
Finally, their understandings about the components of science are different. 
According to naïve methodological falsificationism, science consists of conjectures 
and scientists’ attempts to simply falsify them, whereas, according to sophisticated 
methodological falsificationism, science consists of cautious conjectures but also bold 
conjectures and scientists attempt to falsify cautious conjectures and confirm bold 
conjectures. 
In summary, falsificationism developed in different forms, but it is still insufficient 
either to describe science or to solve the demarcation problem. It suffers from a series 
of logical and philosophical difficulties that should perhaps give us pause if hoping to 
find a single answer to what makes good science and what does not. Lakatos also 
realizes the weaknesses of Popper’s theory raised by contemporary philosophers. I 
will discuss this in the next section. 
Part Ⅲ Lakatos’ modification of Popper’s 
methodological falsificationism--the methodology of 
scientific research programmes 
Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes can be considered as the 
modification of Popper’s falsificationism. It is inspired by the conflict between 
Popper’s theory and Kuhn’s theory. It aims to save Popper’s falsificationism from 
Kuhn’s criticism by “reconstructing scientific progress as proliferation of rival 
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research programmes and progressive and degenerative problemshifts”.14 Lakatos 
particularly applies historical case study in the modification. We can see lots of 
examples of scientific theories and scientific experiments in his The Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes. He also emphasizes that 
“In writing a historical case study, one should, I think, adopt the following procedure: (1) 
one gives a rational reconstruction; (2) one tries to compare this rational reconstruction with 
actual history and to criticize both one’s rational construction for lack of historicity and the 
actual history for lack of rationality. Thus any historical study must be preceded by a heuristic 
study: history of science without philosophy of science is blind”.  (Worrall and Currie, 2001, 
p53, italics in original) 
Before discussing the methodology of scientific research programmes, we should 
make clear the weaknesses of Popper’s theory. 
3.1 Lakatos’ comments about Popper’s methodological 
falsificationism 
For Popper’s methodological falsificationism, Lakatos firstly admits that naïve 
methodological falsificationism solves “the problem of combining hard-hitting 
criticism with fallibilism” by regarding conventional theories as unproblematic, and 
that it saves not only falsification from fallibilism, but the rule of dogmatic 
falsificationism—“scientific honesty consists in specifying, in advance, an experiment 
such that, if the result contradicts the theory, the theory has to be given up”.15 He also 
summarizes that 
“Sophisticated methodological falsificationism blends several different traditions. From the 
Empiricists it has inherited the determination to learn primarily from experience. From the 
Kantians it has taken the activist approach to the theory of knowledge. From the 
conventionalists it has learned the importance of decisions in methodology”. (Worrall and 
Currie, 2001-p38, italics in original) 
                                                        
14 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p92. 
15 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p13. 
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. 
Protective belt 
However, Lakatos sees that some issues for Popper’s methodological 
falsificationism from the history of science. In the first place, it fails to solve the 
problem whether a theory itself or its auxiliary hypothesis leads to falsification yet. 
So a theory cannot be “conclusively falsified”. In the next place, it does not realize 
that it is uncertain in factual history of science that experimental anomalies or 
“refutations” falsify a theory. In most of historical cases, scientists leave them aside 
and do further research. 
3.2 Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes 
After knowing above problems and difficulties of Popper’s methodological 
falsificationism, Lakatos commences establishing his methodology of scientific 
research programmes. He inherits the continuity of science from Popper’s 
sophisticated methodological falsificationism and proposes that it is just the continuity 
that shifts the discussion of scientific theories to the discussion of scientific research 
programmes. All individual theories in a series of theories are connected together by 
the continuity to form a research programme. Science is composed of neither singular 
theories nor a series of theories but rather research programmes. Even science itself 
can be regarded as a huge research programme (see figure 1). A scientific research 
programme (see figure 2) consists of “hard core” and “protective belt”. 
  
Figure 1: Science as a huge research programme         Figure 2: A research programme 
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3.2.1 “Hard core” and “protective belt” 
Lakatos thinks that some parts of a scientific research programme are more 
foundational than others. Generally speaking, they are basic theoretical hypotheses. It 
is only these hypotheses that compose the hard core of a research programme. They 
are also necessary constituents of a research programme. For example, Newton’s three 
laws of motions and his law of gravitational attraction compose the hard core of 
Newtonian physics. This hard core is presupposed to be certainly essential and 
“irrefutable”. With the development of science, a hard core may be supplemented by 
adding some new laws, auxiliary hypotheses, and even experimental and 
mathematical techniques because, according to Lakatos, “if the positive heuristic is 
clearly spelt out, the difficulties of the programme are mathematical rather than 
empirical”.16 
Outside of this hard core, there are a variety of auxiliary hypotheses to support and 
protect the hard core in the face of anomalies. These hypotheses compose the 
protective belt of a research programme. Although a research programme may change 
sooner or later, its hard core usually stays constant. Change and adjustment always 
happens in the protective belt. In Lakatos’ view, when an observation or experiment is 
inconsistent with a programme, it as an anomaly will point to the protective belt of a 
research programme, not to the hard core. It seems to solve above first problem of 
Popper’s methodological falsificationism. The hard core of a theory is exempt from 
falsification. Consequently, it is possible that a series of theories have the same hard 
core but have different protective belts in a research programme. 
3.2.2 Negative heuristic and positive heuristic 
Besides above two theoretical parts—hard core and protective belt, scientific 
research programmes have two methodological rules which guide the research of 
science: negative heuristic and positive heuristic. Lakatos thinks these two rules are 
the main work of scientific research programmes. A negative heuristic helps to 
                                                        
16 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p51. 
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determine what procedures scientists should not follow, what entities they should not 
accept, and so on. It dictates that modus tollens is inapplicable to the hard core and 
forbids that the hard core is rejected or adjusted17. Counterevidence is powerless to 
the hard core. Scientists should pay attention to how to adjust the protective belt of a 
research programme instead of the hard core. If scientists try to adjust the hard core in 
a research programme, they deviate from this program18. For example, the assumption 
of heliocentricity (that the Earth goes around the Sun) is the “hard core” of 
Copernican astronomy. The job of scientists is simply limited to the adjustment of 
peripheral protective belt of the system under the guidance of the hard core. As a 
result a hard core is generally not falsified and rejected in the face of anomalies. 
Negative heuristic provides a hard core with a principle guarantee.  
In the discussion of negative heuristics, Lakatos also introduces a criterion to judge 
whether a research programme is successful or has failed. As mentioned above, he 
derives it from Popper’s division between progressive and degenerative problemshifts. 
If the process of protecting a hard core causes a progressive problem-shift, then the 
research programme is successful. If it causes a degenerative problem-shift, then the 
research programme has failed. For progressive problem-shift and degenerative 
problem-shift, Lakatos clarifies that, if a problem-shift can account for a refutation 
and predict novel facts, then it is progressive; and if a problem-shift fails to predict 
novel facts but only accounts for refutation, it is just ad hoc, and then it is 
degenerative. Here, “novel facts” is different from the “novel facts” of sophisticated 
methodological falsificationism. According to the latter, a prediction is regarded as 
“novel” only if the facts predicted by it have never been observed before it. Here, 
“novel facts” also means those facts observed before, but they were not explicitly 
explained by previous theories, or they are also the already-known anomalies in 
previous theories. Lakatos further points out that if a research programme is 
progressive, it is rational to adjust and change auxiliary hypotheses of its protective 
belt in order to defend its hard core from anomalies; and if a research programme is 
                                                        
17 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p48. 
18 A. F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? Open University Press, 3rd Edition, 1999, p133. 
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degenerative, it will be falsified by the replacement of a better one. Lakatos instances 
Newton’s gravitational theory as a successful research programme. He points out that: 
“When it was first produced, it was submerged in an ocean of ‘anomalies’ (or, if you wish, 
‘counterexamples’), and opposed by the observational theories supporting these anomalies. 
But Newtonians turned, with brilliant tenacity and ingenuity, one counter-instance after 
another into corroborating instances, primarily by overthrowing the original observational 
theories in the light of which this ‘contrary evidence’ was established. In the process they 
themselves produced new counter-examples which they again resolved. They ‘turned each 
new difficulty into a new victory of their programme’…If we analyse it, it turns out that each 
successive link in this exercise predicts one new fact; each step represents an increase in 
empirical content: the example constitutes a consistently progressive theoretical shift. Also, 
each prediction is in the end verified; although on three subsequent occasions they may have 
seemed momentarily to be ‘refuted’”. (Worrall and Currie, 2001, p 48, italics in original) 
In addition, Lakatos holds that “the programme as a whole should also display an 
intermittently progressive empirical shift”. That is, novel facts are not always 
produced at once. Scientists can leave anomalies aside until a better theory with novel 
facts appears. From above statement, negative heuristic seems to be the view of 
convention. But, Lakatos emphasizes an exception--it is allowable that the hard core 
is rejected iff the research programme cannot predict novel facts any more. It weakens 
the weight of convention. 
Positive heuristic is the other methodological rule of scientific research 
programmes. It suggests what scientists should try to do in a research programme and 
provides a protective belt with guidance on how to produce new explanations to fight 
with anomalies. For empirical anomalies, scientists generally leave them aside as long 
as they have no influence on the progress of a research programme. Sometimes they 
may be solved with the development of the programme. Anomalies may be just some 
trivial by-products of scientific research. They can get more attention only if a 
positive heuristic cannot motivate scientists. That is, scientists will turn their attention 
into anomalies when the research programme cannot predict novel facts any more. 
What scientists should evaluate and test is a research programme, not a singular 
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theory or a series of theories. Anomalies never can be regarded as evidence which 
eliminates a research programme, since “no accepted basic statement alone entitles us 
to reject a theory”.19 Positive heuristic gives a research programme more space to 
survive and develop. Lakatos takes the example of Newton’s programme of a 
planetary system to account for positive heuristic and concludes that the existence of 
refutations is expected and positive heuristic is just the strategy both for predicting 
and digesting these refutations20. 
Additionally, Lakatos addresses that the methodology of scientific research 
programmes explains the “relative autonomy” of theoretical science which is not 
discovered by earlier falsificationisms. According to earlier falsificationisms, the 
problems researched by scientists mainly result from the falsification of previous 
theories by empirical evidence or the empirical confirmation of novel facts of a better 
theory. However, in the methodology of scientific research programmes, Lakatos 
holds that scientists do not pay much attention to anomalies. What they focus on 
researching is the problems specified by the positive heuristic of a research 
programme, rather than by “psychologically worrying (or theoretically urgent) 
anomalies”.21 Scientists will turn their attentions to anomalies only if the motivating 
power of the positive heuristic weakens. Consequently, theoretical science is relative 
autonomy.  
3.2.3 Lakatos’ criterion of demarcation 
Having stated main content of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programmes, we should sum up his criterion of demarcation in order to make this 
clearer. 
Lakatos proposes “an amended demarcation criterion” in order to modify Popper’s 
definition of science. He tries to shift the problem of evaluating “theories” to the 
                                                        
19 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p150. 
20 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p50-60. 
21 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p52. 
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problem of evaluating “research programmes”. In his opinion, a research programme 
has a hard core with convention and a protective belt which can predict anomalies and 
shift them to supporting evidence successfully. A research programme can be retained 
only if it can predict novel facts. Once it cannot do so any more, a new research 
programme may appear as an alternative. The new one must be progressive. It 
replaces the old one only if its novel prediction is confirmed. From this point, it seems 
to be proper to say that Lakatos’ methodology focuses on the demarcation between 
progressive and degenerative research programmes rather than the demarcation 
between science and pseudoscience. The criterion of demarcation is relatively 
moderate. It is more consistent with the history of science. According to it, some 
classical scientific theories which may be rejected in earlier falsificationisms can get 
back to scientific status. Moreover, it should be noticed that scientists can perform the 
replacement with hindsight, since it may take scientists several decades to confirm 
that the prediction of the new research programme is novel. Lakatos holds that both 
“refutation” and “crucial experiment” are also known and accepted several decades 
later. 
For different research programmes, Lakatos adopts different attitudes to treat them. 
Lakatos is tolerant toward a new or young research programme. He explicitly 
proposes that  
“we must not discard a budding research programme simply because it has so far failed to 
overtake a powerful rival. We should not abandon it if, supposing its rival were not there, it 
would constitute a progressive problemshift. And we should certainly regard a newly 
interpreted fact as a new fact, ignoring the insolent priority claims of amateur fact collectors. 
As long as a budding research programme can be rationally reconstructed as a progressive 
problemshift, it should be sheltered for a while from a powerful established rival”. (Worrall 
and Currie, 2001, p70-71, italics in original)  
For a developed research programme, Lakatos adopts a quite different attitude. A 
developed research programme must have been tested many times. Its protective belt 
is improved and the research programme tends to be more powerful in predicting and 
explaining phenomena. Accordingly, Lakatos believes that it is reasonable that a 
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developed research programme can be retained as long as its rivals predict novel facts 
less than it, since an enduring programme has developed a certain resistance to 
immediate rejection. 
In the amended criterion, the significance of falsification seems to be weakened, 
whereas the significance of confirmation which is refused by Popper is re-emphasized. 
Lakatos realizes that confirmation seems to play a more important role than 
falsification in positive heuristic, since the confirmation of a recent theory may be 
equal to the falsification of a previous theory. In addition, no matter whether a 
research programme has been falsified or not, it can be replaced by a more 
progressive one. The mark of progress is the confirmation of novel facts predicted by 
a new research programme rather than the falsification of an old research programme. 
As a result, we can see that falsification plays a less important role in Lakatos’ theory 
than it does in Popper’s theory.  
3.3 Compare Popper’s methodological falsificationism with 
Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes 
Having discussed Popper’s methodological falsificationism and Lakatos’ 
methodology of scientific research programmes, it is necessary to summarize the 
similarities and the differences between them. 
From what we have discussed thus far, we can see that both Popper and Lakatos 
are concerned with the demarcation between science and pseudoscience and the 
growth of knowledge. Both of them consider the function of auxiliary hypotheses in 
science. Although they apply auxiliary hypotheses by different methods, both of them 
have the different degree of convention. And they realize that the progress of science 
is a process that a better theory or research programme replaces the old one. The 
better one not only predicts novel facts, but also accounts for the content of the 
previous one, and some of these facts can be confirmed. Moreover, both of them 
emphasize the importance of “novel facts” in the progress of science.  
Although Lakatos’ methodology stems from Popper’s falsificationism, there are 
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many differences between them. 
Firstly, their basic units of scientific research are different. Popper’s basic unit of 
scientific research is falsifiable theories, and later a series of theories. However, 
Lakatos’ basic unit of scientific research is research programmes. 
From the above difference, a second one follows. Their descriptions about the 
progress of science are different. As mentioned above, according to Popper’s 
sophisticated methodological falsificationism, a series of theories are composed of 
bold conjectures and cautious conjectures. The progress of science relies on the 
confirmation of bold conjectures and the falsification of cautious conjectures. All bold 
conjectures or cautious conjectures will be either confirmed or falsified over time. 
Once a bold conjecture is confirmed, it is possible that it becomes a cautious 
conjecture over time—for example, the heliocentricity is a bold conjecture for 
Ptolemaic followers, whereas it is a cautious conjecture for Copernican followers after 
being confirmed; and once a cautious conjecture is falsified, it may produce a bold 
conjecture—for example, the geocentricity is a cautious conjecture for Ptolemaic 
followers. When it is falsified by Copernicus, a bold conjecture--the heliocentricity is 
proposed. Consequently, conjectures changes with the progress of science and they 
are considered in historical terms. However, in Lakatos’ methodology of scientific 
research programmes, the progress of science relies on the inside adjustment of a 
research programme and the replacement of a degenerative research programme by a 
progressive research programme. Although both adjustment and replacement seem to 
be historically based, Lakatos’ division of research programmes into hard core and 
protective belt is not a historical division. Both of them will be present simultaneously 
in a given research programme. 
Finally, they apply different research methods. The dominant principle of Popper’s 
theory is logical. He even calls the method of empirical science the logic of scientific 
discovery. Logical analysis can be seen throughout his whole theory. For example, by 
shifting inductive reasoning into deductive reasoning, he bypasses the problem of 
induction and proposes his falsification criterion. However, Lakatos’ arguments stress 
the historical aspect of scientific progress more than Popper’s. He uses a lot of 
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historical examples to test Popper’s methodological falsificationism, and modifies it 
according to the history of science. Although, as mentioned above, hard core and 
protective belt are not considered in historical terms, the result of Lakatos’ 
modification makes science more consistent with historical facts. Historical method 
guides Lakatos to modify Popper’s methodological falsificationism. 
Part Ⅳ Comments 
When Popper and Lakatos research the progress of science, their respective 
theories also similarly compose the progress of philosophy of science. It is very 
significant for us to know and evaluate them. From above statement and comparison, 
we have gained a general understanding about them. Evaluations about them will be 
discussed in following parts. 
4.1 The influences of Popper’s methodological falsificationism 
and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes 
Popper’s methodological falsificationism is generally acknowledged to be Popper’s 
great and influential contribution to philosophy of science. His discussion about the 
logical asymmetry between confirmation and falsification forms the core of his 
philosophy of science. In his view, confirmation from induction is invalid in logic, 
whereas falsification from deduction is valid in logic. Actually, the distinction is 
firmly rooted in the nature of confirmation and induction respectively. Of its very 
nature, induction is an ampliative inference; i.e. one where there is more contained in 
the argument’s conclusion than can be validly deduced from the premises. Popper 
establishes his falsificationism by a logical shift--from inductive reasoning to 
deductive reasoning. The shift shakes the dominant status of traditional inductive 
reasoning in scientific research. It also bypasses the problem of induction which has 
puzzled philosophers of science since Hume. Popper’s falsification criterion provides 
people with a totally new set of standards by which to judge whether an investigation 
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is scientific. As Lakatos noticed, in the background of a major epistemological 
research programme, it can be concluded that Popper’s criterion of demarcation gives 
a new function to experience in science:  “scientific theories are not based on, 
established or ‘probabilified’ by, ‘facts’ but rather eliminated by them”.22 This is a far 
stricter standard than the confirmation criterion of inductivism in logic. 
As far as Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes is concerned, it 
inherits some views of Popper’s sophisticated methodological falsificationism, such 
as the continuity of science, the confirmation criterion of novel facts and so on. He 
makes some modifications to these. In the first place, Lakatos replaces a series of 
theories of sophisticated methodological falsificationism with the idea of research 
programmes. This modification turns scientific research from traditional linear 
discussion (simple replacement of theories), to include a broader set of systematic 
concerns, because a research programme includes not only theoretical content but also 
methodological rules. This provides scientists with more ways in which to do 
scientific research.  
In the second place, besides logical method, Lakatos lays more stress on historical 
method in scientific research. Under the guidance of the history of science, he probes 
the progress of science and modifies Popper’s methodological falsificationism to be 
consistent with the historical facts of science. 
In the last place, the division of a research programme into a hard core and a 
protective belt solves the problem of why some classical scientific theories in history 
of science can develop in the face of anomalies, and bypasses the attack of empirical 
anomalies to the central tenet of a research programme. It also explains “the relative 
autonomy of theoretical science”.23 The growth of science relies on the development 
of scientific research programme itself and the replacement between progressive and 
degenerative research programmes, rather than solution of difficulties from empirical 
anomalies. This view is not realized by previous falsificationists, such as naïve 
                                                        
22 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p141. 
23 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p52. 
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methodological falsificationists. What is more; Lakatos particularly pays attention to 
how to treat a new or young theory when it faces empirical anomalies. Lakatos gives 
it more tolerant conditions to benefit its growth. He even points out that “some of the 
most important research programmes in the history of science were grafted on to 
older programmes with which they were blatantly inconsistent”.24 It seems to be a 
progress, since it offers a research programme more chances to grow.  
4.2 Criticism raised by contemporary philosophers 
Popper’s methodological falsificationism and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific 
research programmes raise many debates among contemporary philosophers of 
science. 
For Popper’s methodological falsificationism, besides Lakatos’ criticisms 
mentioned above, there are some powerful criticisms raised by other contemporary 
philosophers. The most influential criticism may be Duhem-Quine thesis that there 
may be uncertainty in the falsification of a theory because it is difficult to say whether 
the theory itself or other test conditions that is responsible for the falsification. Under 
different test conditions, empirical results may be different. Falsifying and refuting a 
theory simply by experiments may, therefore, be unreasonable. 
Another fundamental criticism comes from Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions which argues that scientists work within a series of paradigms that 
determine how scientists know the world. It is different from Popper that Kuhn offers 
a historical picture of science and tells us how scientists actually behave. Kuhn 
realizes that traditional explanations of science, whether inductivism or 
falsificationism, are not consistent with the historical evidence. He suggests that social, 
psychological and other non-rational factors should be also considered in explaining 
theory-change. Although he advocates the important of these factors, he severely 
denies that he is an irrationalist or relativist about the progress of science. 
For Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, the most critical may 
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be Feyerabend’s view. He completely denies the methodological research of scientific 
progress. In his opinion, what the progress of science relies on is anything goes rather 
than any other prescriptive methodologies. 
An influential criticism mainly focuses on his arguments of hard core and the 
criterion of scientific progress. Through reviewing and analysing the history of 
science, Lakatos suggests that a research programme has a hard core unaffected by 
empirical anomalies. Nevertheless, in the history of science, sometimes scientists do 
modify the hard core of their research programme to solve problems, such as 
Copernicus’ modification concerning the position of the sun25. 
Another criticism concerns Lakatos’ “methodological decision”. Lakatos only tells 
us that a hard core is “irrefutable” by “the methodological decision of its proponents”, 
but he does not explain that this decision is a historical reality or a figment of his 
imagination26. He does not suggest any evidence and method to answer this question. 
For the positive heuristic of a research programme, Lakatos’ methodology claims that 
it suggests and predicts reasonable instructions of how to develop the research 
programme, but this is impossible because “not every potential anomaly could be 
foreseen and a strategy for dealing with it planned”27.  
Additionally, it has been noticed that Lakatos does not give a specific rule to 
eliminate a research programme, even if he makes the criterion between progressive 
and degenerative research programme in the growth of science28. Critics point out that 
it is possible and rational that scientists remain a degenerative research programme 
and expect that it may revive. They think that Copernican theory which gains an 
ultimate victory a century later is a good example. As a result, they conclude that, for 
instance, it may be rational for Marxists to stick to historical materialism29. Now that 
Lakatos has allowed that falsification and refutation are not instant, why does not he 
give more time to Marxism and other sociological research programmes? 
Another problem arises from the dependence of Lakatos’ methodology on the 
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history of physical science. Critics point out that Lakatos lays particular attention to 
the research of physical science in his discussion of methodology. He uses cases study 
of physical science to measure research programmes of other field, such as Marxism 
or astrology30. This may be unreasonable, because it is just an unreliable assumption 
that the criterion of physical science is applicable to all study fields. 
4.3 Some attempts at further discussion 
Having recounted some contemporary philosophers’ criticisms of Popper’s and 
Lakatos’ theories, I will attempt to offer my own discussion of the two. 
Popper insists that inductive reasoning is invalid for a scientific theory in logic. He 
objects to inductive confirmation as the criterion of demarcation between science and 
pseudoscience. However, in his argument about falsificationism, he does not avoid 
inductive reasoning and confirmation entirely. For example, he indicates that 
scientists may try to use ad hoc hypotheses to save their theory from empirical 
falsification. It is just with the help of induction that he draws the conclusion from the 
analysis of many previous scientific theories and the summary of them. As a 
consequence, both deductive and inductive reasoning may play important roles in the 
discussion of scientific demarcation. The neglect of either one must be justified. It is 
impossible to get rid of induction absolutely. 
Secondly, it seems to be also impossible that falsification gets rid of confirmation 
totally. Even Popper’s theory may presuppose some degree of confirmation. For 
example, both experiments and novel facts are used to falsify a theory, but both first 
need to be confirmed or supposed to be confirmed. Without their confirmation, 
falsification would lose its reliability. Consequently, the neglect of confirmation needs 
to be justified. Here, falsificationism leaves a problem that the fact of past success up 
to now is not warrant for future reliability. 
In addition, Popper tries to eliminate the psychological factors from the research of 
science. However, in fact, both scientific discovery and technical invention stem from 
                                                        
30 A. F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? Open University Press, 3rd Edition, 1999, p147. 
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human activities. The demarcation of science about which we are talking is not 
exceptional in this aspect. We establish a theory with bold conjectures, and then test it 
by experiments or observations. The whole process involves psychological factors. 
Comparing with those speculative conjectures, experiments and observations are 
simply relatively natural. Actually, they are also judged by human. As a result, it 
seems to be impossible for scientists to evade the influence of psychological factors 
completely.  
For Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, it certainly leads the 
demarcation of science and the progress of science to enter a more comprehensive and 
complicated research field. By means of historical research, the problem of 
demarcation is no longer a static logical problem but rather a dynamic historical 
problem. With the development of science, the viewpoint about the demarcation of 
science also changes. With the help of the notion of “research programmes” rather 
than that of “a series of theories”, the progress of science is also no longer a linear 
process of replacement of theories, but rather a systematically modificatory and 
alternative process between rival theories and experiments. What is more, by 
specifying a hard core and a protective belt rather than merely “basic statements”, the 
degree of convention is higher, but the progress of science is really more consistent 
with the history of science. 
Besides, Lakatos’ attitude is relatively tolerant of induction. He does not deny 
induction absolutely, and he admits “thin” induction in his methodology of scientific 
research programmes. He thinks that “with a positive solution of the problem of 
induction, however thin, methodological theories of demarcation can be turned from 
arbitrary conventions into rational metaphysics”.31 The rationality of this view seems 
to be worth further discussing. 
In the end, both Popper’s methodological falsificationism and Lakatos’ 
methodology of scientific research programmes aim to clarify the problem of 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience, so as to offer a clear and effective 
                                                        
31 I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Volume1, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p165. 
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criterion to help people know science and guide further scientific research. However, 
can this aim be achieved? Popper proposes falsification as the criterion of 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience. And then, he requires that scientists 
should follow this criterion to establish and test theories. It shows that logical method 
guides the progress of science. In Lakatos’ opinion, it is rational that we know science 
not only by logical method but also by historical method. In other words, the 
methodology of science should be not only valid in logic, but also consistent with the 
history of science. However, there seems to be a problem with the fact that both 
Lakatos’ and Popper’s views are known with hindsight. That is, the progress of 
science may be influenced by other uncertain factors besides logical and historical 
factors in reality, such as social and political conditions. So, it is possible that the 
replacement of a degenerative research programme by a progressive one may be 
realized by scientists several decades later. However, it should be noticed that, just as 
Hume argued, we cannot offer a non-circular rational justification for our inductive 
inferences. In reality, we can, and indeed should, use induction but we cannot offer a 
justification of induction that does not ultimately rest on induction itself. Then, it 
seems to be problematic to guide the future research of science by the criterion with 
hindsight. 
Part Ⅴ Conclusion 
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was to explain why and 
how Lakatos modifies Popper’s falsificationism into his methodology of scientific 
research programmes. Now, let us make a brief summary of this study to assess 
whether this purpose has been achieved.  
Firstly, a review of research methodology before Popper finds that the early 
demarcation criteria of science result from different schools of thought about science 
--justificationism, probabilism and dogmatic falsificationism. The former two claim 
that the empirical confirmation of theories is the demarcation criterion of science. 
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That is, scientific theories must be able to be confirmed by empirical facts. And the 
latter regards the falsification of theories as the demarcation criterion of science. That 
is, scientific theories must be able to be falsified by empirical facts. 
Popper refutes these earlier criteria and proposes his methodological 
falsificationism based on a logical method. As far as the confirmation criterion is 
concerned, Popper thinks that it is unreliable since it brings in the problem of 
induction, and so it may be problematic to demarcate science from pseudoscience by 
means of this criterion. Popper offers an explanation of scientific practice which 
rejects the need for induction and instead proposes that science proceeds by deduction. 
Upon this explanation, he proposes his falsification criterion. At the same time, he 
also amends dogmatic falsificationism. As for Popper’s methodological 
falsificationism, Lakatos divides it into naïve methodological falsificationism and 
sophisticated methodological falsificationism. Briefly, the argument of naïve 
methodological falsificationism is relatively rigorous in science demarcation, whereas 
the argument of sophisticated methodological falsificationism is more tolerant and 
readily applicable to historical facts. For example, the latter holds that science consists 
of “a series of theories” instead of “individual theories” of the former, and replaces 
“reject a previous theory” of the former with “replace a previous theory”. The 
sophisticated form lacks the rigidity of the naïve form. 
However, Popper’s methodological falsificationism still has some problems, even 
if there is some improvement to be seen in its development. These problems raise 
some criticisms from philosophers of science. The purpose of Lakatos’ modification is 
to save Popper’s methodological falsificationism from the most influential 
criticism--Kuhn’s stricture (which is briefly mentioned in the introduction section). 
Lakatos modifies Popper’s methodological falsificationism by establishing his 
methodology of scientific research programmes with the help of the history of science. 
On the whole, Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes is more 
consistent with the history of science than Popper’s methodological falsificationism. 
By replacing “a series of theories” with “research programmes” as components of 
science, Lakatos turns science from a series of static theories to a complicated 
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dynamic system. By specifying hard core and protective belt, Lakatos solves the 
failure of Popper’s methodological falsificationism to explain why some classical 
theories were still retained in the history of science, even if they faced some 
experimental anomalies. Moreover, Lakatos offers a criterion which demarcates 
progressive research programmes from degenerative research programmes, and 
further explains under what condition a research programme can be regarded as 
degenerative and replaced by a progressive research programme. Although it is 
generally known that Lakatos modifies Popper’s methodological falsificationism 
according to the history of science, Lakatos’ division of a research programme into a 
hard core and a protective belt seems not to be historical. 
From the whole study, we can see a clear development line of the methodology of 
science--from original empirical confirmation to dogmatic falsification, and then to 
naïve methodological falsification and sophisticated methodological falsification, and 
finally to the methodology of scientific research programmes. In the process of 
development, the methodology of science is constantly being improved. It proceeds 
from merely emphasizing an individual criterion to considering both confirmation 
criterion and falsification criterion so that the degree of its rigor gradually falls. In 
early stages, philosophers of science only claim either confirmation, or falsification as 
the demarcation criterion of science, and must exclude the other. For example, 
justificationists advocate confirmation, whereas falsificationists advocate falsification. 
However, the emphasis of each one seems not to be sufficient to explain the progress 
of science in the history of science. Lakatos does not excessively stress one of them. 
He admits that empirical facts can falsify hypotheses of protective belt in a research 
programme, but he more emphasizes the function of confirmation. He explicitly 
indicates that the confirmation of novel facts is the mark of progress. Lakatos’ tolerant 
attitude makes his methodology of scientific research programmes more applicable 
than Popper’s methodological falsificationism in the factual history of science. 
Moreover, by replacing theories with research programmes, Lakatos modifies 
Popper’s methodological falsificationism to consider the complexity and the tenacity 
of science and makes it more sophisticated and consistent with the factual history of 
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science. Consequently, we can see that Lakatos modifies Popper’s methodological 
falsificationism effectively. 
Finally, this study shows some potential problems of Lakatos’ theory which are 
worth further discussing.  
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